

War of the Masses: A Component of Guerrilla Warfare

A Monograph

by

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Abstract

War of the Masses: A Component of Guerrilla Warfare, by LTC Carlos A Padilla, Colombian Army, 55 pages.

The Colombian government and the Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces are in the middle of a peace process after more than fifty years of armed struggle. The FARC has been using Guerrilla Warfare as the way to fulfill its objective of power seizure, however, the peace process proves that FARC's military option was not successful.

Using the teachings of Mao Tse-Tung, Vladimir Lenin, and Vo Nguyen Giap, FARC understood that a protracted war encompasses all forms of struggle and that it is more than just an armed struggle. In this specific case, the FARC has been developing a clandestine masses organization component in order to infiltrate social movements in its effort to alter the political landscape within the country, with the sole purpose of reaching its objective in a different way.

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Acronyms

AO	Area of Operations
BACRIM	Organized Criminal Bands
COMINTER	FARC's International Front
DMZ	Demilitarized Zone
ELN	National Liberation Army
FARC	Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces
MBNC	Bolivarian Movement for a New Colombia
MCB	Continental Bolivarian Movement
MP	Marcha Patriótica
OPIC	Multicultural Indian Peoples Organization
PC3	Colombian Clandestine Communist Party
PCC	Colombian Communist Party
PNC	Colombia's National Police
ZRC	Peasant Reserve Zones

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Introduction

“Marxist tactics consist in combining the *different* forms of struggle, in the skillful transition from one form to another, in steadily enhancing the consciousness of the masses and extending the area of their collective actions, each of which, taken separately, may be aggressive or defensive, and all of which, taken together, lead to a more intense and decisive conflict.”

—Vladimir Lenin, *Forms of the Working-Class Movement*

Colombia is currently in the development of a peace process with the Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces, FARC, one of the oldest guerrilla groups in the world. The FARC was born in 1964 and during its development, adopted Mao's and Giap's models of Popular Protracted War. In its more than fifty years of armed struggle, there have been several unsuccessful attempts to bring peace through dialogs. In some of those attempts, the dialogs never started, even though all the initial conditions that the guerrilla demanded were given to them.¹ It is indeed true that this time, the dialogs have been conducted without a DMZ, like in 1998, or a cease-fire, but in the middle of ongoing operations.² The question that arises is why should the negotiations work this time? Have the changes in military organization and doctrine of the Colombian military and the political will to deal with the guerrilla problem been enough to put the FARC in a position to negotiate or is it just a masquerade of their real intentions? The country has invested a lot in a changing policy for security in the last thirteen years. Colombia adapted the military perspective, through reorganization and improvement on the proficiency of the

¹ Luis Villamarin, *La Silla Vacía* (Bogotá: Ediciones Luis Villamarin, 2005), 86. A Demilitarized Zone was established for the FARC by the government of Andres Pastrana for more than three years, even though the initial timing was only 90 days, as a precondition to start peace dialogs. The DMZ comprised five counties and 42,000 km² in which there was not military or police presence. It was used by the FARC also as a platform to launch attacks on military units, small towns, and infrastructure.

² EFE, “Cronología: Así fueron los diálogos de San Vicente del Caguan,” *El Colombiano*, August 27, 2012, accessed September 12, 2015, http://www.elcolombiano.com/dialogos_en_san_vicente_del_caguan_cronologia-CFEC_204017.

formations, but also in the development of infrastructure and social systems in order to bring state presence throughout the country and to cope with FARC's influence. The military has inflicted a lot of damage to the FARC, to a point in which they no longer believe their goals to be attainable through the armed struggle, however, as Mao stated, a protracted war encompasses all forms of struggle.³ In addition, for Lenin, the combination of all of them is what leads to a more intense or decisive conflict.⁴ In this specific case, it appears that FARC has transitioned to a war of the masses stage.

The purpose of the study is to understand what the FARC's possibilities of changing the country's landscape through a war of the masses are instead of an armed struggle, taking advantage of not only creating a political movement as an outcome of the peace process, but especially of being able to infiltrate base social organizations throughout the country, rural as well as urban. In order to initiate a war of the masses, the initial step is to have an organizational body for that sole purpose. When FARC is viewed as a whole system and subjected to a systemic analysis, a paramount component designed to fulfill the previous insurgent goals emerges: the masses organization. The *Bolivarian Movement for a New Colombia* as well as some other plans designed with a similar purpose are part of the masses organization component.⁵ The primary goal of this study is to discover how well developed the masses organization component is as a required condition within FARC in order to create a dramatic change in the political landscape of the country after a successful peace process. The study reviews two cases in which the Colombian

³ Mao Tse-Tung, *Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung* (Peking: People's Publishing House, 1960), 136-155, accessed September 14, 2015, <http://www.marx2mao.com/PDFs/MaoSW2.pdf>.

⁴ "Forms of the Working-Class Movement," Marxists Internet Archive, 2004, accessed September 14, 2015, <https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1914/apr/04.htm>.

⁵ César Augusto Castaño, "Dos Estructuras Funcionales," *Revista Semana*, September 01, 2007, accessed September 14, 2015, <http://www.semana.com/opinion/articulo/dos-estructuras-funcionales/87973-3>.

Armed Forces has had to deal with unarmed masses while performing their duties. The outcome has not been favorable for the Army or the National Police.⁶ In both cases, the units have had to leave the area, at least temporarily creating tactical, operational, and perhaps even strategic risk.

This study is organized into seven sections. Following this introduction is the literature review. The literature review covers the basis of Mao Tse-Tung's and Vo Nguyen Giap's theories of Protracted War and Russian Insurrectional model. The second section illustrates how the FARC is composed, its purpose, and its objectives using the lens of systemic analysis, and highlighting the new adaptation of the masses organization component. The third section provides a review of the "Bolivarian Movement for a New Colombia" and another plans as the FARC's change in strategy in order to use the masses organization component as the baseline for non-violent insurgency. Section five is an overview of Cauca department since is in here where the two cases took place. Section six is the first case study that examines an army platoon that is thrown out of a communications relay outpost in a mountain top by an unarmed mass. Section seven is the second case study that examines a national police unit (minor size station) that is located in a small town and is expelled out of the village by more than 500 inhabitants. Finally, the conclusion summarizes the findings, the implications for the country, and provides recommendations.

Literature Review

The literature review focuses on the theories that FARC uses as their relevant revolutionary framework. The FARC has studied the revolutionary theories of Mao, Vo Nguyen Giap, and Lenin and have adapted these to a single functional model. This review will frame the

⁶ The term Military Forces refers only to Army, Navy, and Air Force, whereas Armed Forces include also the National Police.

ideology followed and the construct created by the adaptations made to existing theories in pursuit of accomplishing its final objective.

The FARC was born in 1964, but it was not until 1966 that adopted its actual name. In that year, the group held its second conference, and amongst other things, created its founding charter.⁷ As a result of the reunion, the FARC decided its purpose as “ending the social, economical, and political inequities; the military involvement and capital investment of United States in Colombia, as well as establishing a Marxist-Leninist and Bolivarian state in Colombia.”⁸ In the subsequent conferences, no relevant decisions were made, until the seventh conference took place. The seventh conference was held in 1982, and it was during this meeting that a strategic plan was decided and put together.⁹ In order to achieve this plan, the FARC concluded that it was necessary to adopt a relevant revolutionary framework; therefore, a combination of Mao Tse-Tung and Vo Nguyen Giap models of protracted war was adopted as well as elements of the Bolshevik revolution of 1917.¹⁰ Consequently, it is necessary to examine these revolutionary foundations in order to understand the FARC.¹¹

⁷ Angel Rabasa and Peter Chalk, “Colombian Labyrinth: The Synergy of Drugs and Insurgency and Its Implications for Regional Stability,” *RAND Corporation*, January 1, 2001, accessed September 24, 2015, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1339.html. When the FARC was born, it was decided that by doing conferences with representatives of each one of the FARC’s Fronts, the organization would define its path in all matters. Through the conferences is that the FARC has designed the strategic plan for fulfilling its main objective. It has also served to adjust previous plans according to current conditions. FARC has held nine conferences so far.

⁸ “FARC-EP,” *Cuba Debate Contra el Terrorismo Mediático*, 2014, accessed September 25, 2015, <http://www.cubadebate.cu/etiqueta/farc-ep/>.

⁹ Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica, *Guerrilla y Población Civil. Trayectoria de las FARC 1949-2013*, 115, May 2014, accessed September 25, 2015, <http://www.centrodememoriahistorica.gov.co/descargas/informes2013/farc/guerrilla-poblacion-civil.pdf>.

¹⁰ Mayor General Hernando A. Ortiz, “Reflexiones Estrategicas de la Operación Jaque y las FARC un Año Después,” *Universidad Militar Nueva Granada*, 2009, accessed September 26, 2015, <http://www.umng.edu.co/documents/63968/76129/RRelinter2009-2Ponencia.pdf>.

¹¹ Mario Aguilera Peña, “Las FARC: Auge y Quiebre de su Modelo de Guerra,” *Análisis*

The Mao Tse-Tung Model

For Mao, guerilla warfare is not an isolated form of war, but complementary of the war waged by the regular army. Thus, the coordination of both would create the conditions to defeat the oppressor, which was required in order to deal with the Japanese occupation. In addition, guerrilla warfare is only one of the pieces of the revolutionary struggle. Obviously, guerrilla warfare is necessary due to one of the sides being inferior in arms and weapons. However, when the occupation reaches the deep country, the terrain, climate, and society can be turned against the attackers (in this case the Japanese Army) with the purpose of resisting and defeating him.¹²

Guerrilla warfare must be tied to national policy, since this type of warfare could not be disconnected from a centralized authority and the entire nation must be involved, therefore its character resides within the population. There are two kinds of guerrilla warfare: one inspired by the invasion of another country that requires people's unity against the invader, and the other based on class struggles. Since guerrilla warfare is based on the people's involvement, the masses must be organized in a coherent way.¹³ Mao explains the difference between regular operations and guerrilla warfare, and emphasis is made on activity, movement, and tactics. Mao states that in the first kind of guerrilla warfare, the purpose is to support regular army operations. The author brings several examples of guerrilla warfare throughout the history, making special reference to those employed in Russia against Napoleon in 1812 and in China against the Japanese. Mao also states the importance of creating a United Front as a way to fight the oppressor by building great alliances with other political parties and entities.

Político 26 no. 77 (21 April 2013), accessed September 27, 2015, <http://www.revistas.unal.edu.co/index.php/anpol/article/view/44005/45253>.

¹² Mao Tse-Tung, *On Guerrilla Warfare*, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1961), 21.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 24.

Later in his work, Mao explores the theory even further by explaining the tactics and the strategy of the guerrilla forces in the war against the Japanese invasion. Mao understands that the number of people and the rural areas play in favor of China against the Japanese, however, being unorganized these advantages are not fully realized. In this sense, the will of the people to fight for the nation is paramount as it is the only way to bring legitimacy to the revolutionary cause and would guarantee the continuation of the struggle. In addition, since China has so much territory, it is possible to trade space for time, in order to create the conditions to win the war. On that account, guerrilla warfare contributes to achieve the final goal by slowing down and harassing the Japanese. Mao proceeds to explain the differences between the seven kinds of guerrilla units, and how those should be organized in levels from squad up to regiment and brigade size. In addition, highlights the distinction between the self-defense unit or rear unit and the regular units or the units in an active zone war. One of the most important factors for any guerrilla is that its members should be volunteers to guarantee their will to fight and their commitment to the cause. Mao's proposal to solve the problem for equipping the guerrilla units is contained within the same tactics employed by guerrilla warfare, by taking away the supplies, weapons, and ammunition of the enemy. The political goal has to be clear and embedded in the minds of the guerrilla members as the way to maintain their will and commitment to fight, especially when dealing with the hardships of guerrilla warfare. Since it is imperative to achieve a spiritual union within the guerrilla members and between those and the people, the conduct of the former is of paramount importance. A code to treat people in the best way is issued as a way to gain and keep the popular support. Guerrilla warfare has strategic implications due to its three main functions: attack the enemy on its rear, establish bases, and extend the rear areas.¹⁴ The fundamental axiom of combat applies here: "Conservation of one's own strength; destruction of enemy strength," as well as the

¹⁴ Tse-Tung, *On Guerrilla Warfare*, 87.

six necessary requirements for its fulfillment.¹⁵ This is a way to stress the relevancy of a protracted war by a guerrilla force against a regular force in order to change the tide in the revolutionary war to favor of the former and defeat the latter. Mao also writes about the importance of creating bases as secure havens for guerrilla forces. These bases are better located in areas where the enemy cannot extend its reach and it gives the guerrilla force the ability to move to mobile warfare as a necessary step towards the evolution of the protracted war into a regular war. However, to achieve this last stage, the quality and quantity of the guerrilla force has to be improved, as well as the political training and the discipline. Parallel to these conditions is the need for continuous support of the population. By doing so, the nature of the war then can be of a National scale.¹⁶

In his theory, Mao suggests the necessity to change the traditional components of doctrine such as arms, manpower, and logistics for intangibles. Those intangibles are space, time, and will. The concept is that China had enough space to trade it for the necessary time to create a solid force able to fight the imperial Japanese army. Time is also imperative to create the required revolutionary consciousness among the people and to guarantee the will to fight and bring forth a new political system. The will also translates into people, their support, and the legitimacy. Hence, without the people's will, the guerrilla cannot survive.¹⁷ The combination of guerrilla forces with orthodox or regular forces is also preponderant to achieve the desired national results. As part of the combination of forces, the war could be one of movement or positional, or even combine both methods, but this will be more evident as the guerrilla force evolves in quality and

¹⁵ Tse-Tung, *On Guerrilla Warfare*, 95.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 136.

¹⁷ Florian Waitl, "Mao Tse-Tung and General Vo Nguyen Giap on Guerrilla Warfare," *Military History Online*, September 09, 2007, accessed 28 September, 2015, <http://www.militaryhistoryonline.com/20thcentury/articles/maotsetunggiap.aspx>.

strength and especially when it comes closer to reach the final objective.¹⁸ Mao also states the three stages of the Protracted War, its characteristics, and the tactics to be employed in each one of them: strategic defensive, strategic stalemate, and strategic offensive.¹⁹ In the following table, it is possible to understand how the FARC adopted Mao's model of Protracted War.²⁰

Table 1. FARC's adaptation of Protracted War

STAGE	CHARACTERISTICS	MODE OF WARFARE	POLITICAL – MILITARY OBJECTIVES
I. Force Accumulation	Strategic defensive Tactical offensive Benefits the enemy	GUERRILLA WARFARE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Accumulate forces and disperse the enemy • Create embryos of popular power • Territorial dispute • Guerrilla consolidation
II. Dynamic Forces Equilibrium	Strategic confrontation Tactical offensive Dynamic equilibrium	MOBILE WARFARE Guerrilla warfare	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Confrontation of forces • Integrate war fronts • Expand rear areas • Create army corps • Use military resources at large scale
III. General Offensive and Power Seizure	Strategic Offensive Tactical Offensive Benefits the revolution	POSITIONAL WARFARE Mobile warfare Guerrilla warfare	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Disarticulate and defeat of armed forces • Combination of war and general insurrection • Destroy the bourgeois state

Source: Data adapted from Mario Aguilera Peña, "Las FARC: Auge y Quiebre de su Modelo de Guerra," in *Análisis Político* 26, no. 77 (21 April 2013), accessed September 27, 2015 <http://www.revistas.unal.edu.co/index.php/anpol/article/view/44005/45253>.

¹⁸ Columbia University, "Selections from On Guerrilla Warfare (1937)," *Asia for Educators*, accessed September 30, 2015, http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/ps/china/mao_guerrilla_warfare.pdf.

¹⁹ Lieutenant Colonel John W. Woodmansee Jr., "Mao's Protracted War: Theory vs. Practice," *Strategic Studies Institute*, accessed October 1, 2015, <http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/Articles/1973/woodmansee.pdf>.

²⁰ Aguilera, "Las FARC: Auge y Quiebre de su Modelo de Guerra."

The Vo Nguyen Giap's Model

Ho Chi Minh recognized Vo Nguyen Giap as an individual possessing a “natural bent for strategic affairs,” therefore persuaded him to travel to China to learn all about the successful revolution.²¹ After studying Mao's people's war in China, Giap realized that it was possible to use it as a baseline but he did incorporate some changes. Unlike Mao, for Giap it was possible to conduct an irregular campaign not only in the countryside but also in urban areas at the same time and from different directions, with the purpose of creating confusion in the enemy, making the enemy scatter its forces, and accelerating the warfare process. In order to achieve this, Giap also took the teachings of Napoleon and incorporated them in his theory of warfare. At the end of 1946, Giap showed a glimpse of what would be his future way of fighting: simultaneous strikes on outposts both urban and rural from different directions, complemented by sabotage against key infrastructure.²² Giap also incorporated another change in the conception of his own warfare theory. Giap's theory adopted the three stages of protracted war, however, unlike the sequential development of Mao at the same time throughout the country, Giap recognized the viability and necessity of having any of the stages in different parts of the country.²³ With this combination, he was able to improve even more his idea of turmoil creation thus forcing his opponent to distribute his forces further, stripping him from the ability to concentrate forces against his own. Giap also included in his theory, the intention to change back and forth between the stages, as another way to confuse the enemy, mask his own intentions, hide his advances, and to guarantee the required

²¹ John Arquilla, *Insurgents, Raiders, and Bandits: How Masters of Irregular Warfare Have Shaped Our World* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, 2011), 230.

²² *Ibid.*, 231.

²³ “A History of Guerrilla Warfare. How the Weak Vanquish the Strong,” *The Economist*, Jan 19, 2013, accessed October 1, 2015, <http://www.economist.com/news/books-and-arts/21569681-fighting-insurgency-requires-patience-restraint-and-good-public-relations>.

conditions for the overall objective.²⁴ Giap's three stages of Protracted War are: Stage of Contention (organization and guerrilla warfare), Stage of Equilibrium (mix of guerrilla and mobile warfare), and Stage of Counteroffensive (mobile warfare with conventional forces including some positional warfare).²⁵ However, the biggest lessons are that the model was the "people's war, long-term war, guerilla warfare developing step by step into mobile warfare."²⁶

The Russian Insurrectional Model

Vladimir Lenin, a thorough student of Marx's *Capital*, understood that the Russian reality was different from the rest of Europe in regards not only to culture but also to society conformation. Even though Lenin embraced Marx's theory, for Russia, instead of seeing the people as a single mass, Lenin stated that the "Proletariat" was the modern working class.²⁷ For Lenin, all the workers should embrace the political party, however, only the more reliable, experienced, and hardened workers organized in a small group, following very tight secretive practices, could consolidate and develop the revolutionary movement. This vanguard, guided by the party, has to have the responsibility of safeguarding the revolutionary principles whilst creating the conditions for the revolution.²⁸ In this sense, the working class, or proletariat is the key element for the revolutionary consciousness. It is the spark that ignites the revolution. The devotion of the vanguard's members, their ability to link-up, merge and maintain contact with the

²⁴ Waitl, "Mao Tse-Tung and General Vo Nguyen Giap on Guerrilla Warfare."

²⁵ Robert J. O'Neill, *General Giap: Politician and Strategist* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969), 62.

²⁶ General Vo Nguyen Giap, *The Military Art of People's War. Selected Writings of General Vo Nguyen Giap*, ed. Russel Stetler (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971), 106.

²⁷ Andrew Hornung and John O'Mahony, "Lenin and the Russian Revolution," *Workers' Liberty*, March 15, 2010, accessed October 2, 2015, <http://www.workersliberty.org/story/2010/03/15/lenin-and-russian-revolution>.

²⁸ Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, "What Is To Be Done?," Marxists Internet Archive, accessed October 3, 2015, <https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1901/witbd/iv.htm#v05fl61h-440-GUESS>.

proletariat and the correctness of the leadership exercised by the vanguard, are conditions that help to create the necessary revolution.²⁹ Once the vanguard created the conditions required for the revolution, and taking into account the tactics of combining the different forms of struggle as a way to enhance the consciousness of the masses, a general strike is called upon, thus moving towards the general insurrection in the cities, which in turn would derivate into a transitional government.³⁰ The organization of the Russian workers' revolutionary drive into a fighting party guaranteed the success.³¹

Table 2. FARC's adaptation of Insurrectional Model

STAGE	MILITARY OBJECTIVE	POLITICAL OBJECTIVE
I. Force Accumulation and Preparation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Organization of political – military direction structures • Guerrilla warfare • Army creation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Political and revolutionary party activities • United front activities
II. Insurrectional	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • General insurrection • Deployment of the army • Enemy forces neutralization • Guerrilla/mobile/positional warfare 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • General strike
III. Strengthening	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Enemy forces annihilation campaign • Combination of guerrilla/mobile/positional warfare 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Revolutionary government

Source: Data adapted from Mario Aguilera Peña, “Las FARC: Auge y Quiebre de su Modelo de Guerra,” in *Análisis Político* 26 no. 77 (21 April 2013), accessed September 27, 2015, <http://www.revistas.unal.edu.co/index.php/anpol/article/view/44005/45253>.

After debating the three different theories during the seventh conference, finally, the FARC developed its own war model. The understanding of each one of the theories and using the most functional elements of each one, like the agrarian baseline mixed with the necessity to

²⁹ Vladimir Lenin, *Left Wing Communism, an Infantile Disorder* (New York: International Publishers, 1985), 34.

³⁰ Vladimir Lenin, “Forms of the Working-Class Movement,” *Lenin Collected Works* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1972), 210.

³¹ Lenin, *Left Wing Communism*, 67.

involve the urban workers, and by adapting everything to the Colombian reality in order to have an actionable model, it would support FARC's main objective: transform the government into a Marxist-Leninist and Bolivarian state.³² Following Giap's teachings, the stages depicted in FARC's model can be acted upon simultaneously with two purposes: to ease the lack of resources for the entire group and to bring confusion to the State.



Figure 1. FARC's war model

Source: Data adapted from Mario Aguilera Peña, "Las FARC: Auge y Quiebre de su Modelo de Guerra," in *Análisis Político* 26, no. 77 (21 April 2013), accessed September 27, 2015, <http://www.revistas.unal.edu.co/index.php/anpol/article/view/44005/45253>.

FARC as a System

The FARC is anything but a simple, conventional terrorist organization. It has taken three different theoretical models, adapted, and adopted them to its own reality. In order to understand

³² Cuba Debate, "FARC-EP."

its different components, the interaction, and the relevance of them, it is important to observe it as a system instead of as a monolithic body and study the organization from the perspective of the sum of its parts which will be greater than the combined total of the parts themselves. A system is defined as an assembly of elements with a relation to one another and that contribute to a specific end; however, FARC has proved to be a complex adaptive system.³³ A system is complex when the strong interactions amongst its elements can increase the probabilities of many kinds of later events without the ability to predict the outcomes. It is also adaptive when the agents or populations of the system, seek to adapt to changing conditions or situations.³⁴

During the first decade of the 2000s, the Colombian Armed Forces, with the required support from the government, structured a joint campaign plan against FARC called “Plan Patriota.” Plan Patriota or Patriot Plan focused only in three departments: Meta, Guaviare, and Putumayo. The objective was to conduct sustained military operations targeting all FARC structures in the region, supported by an interagency effort (Plan de Acción Integral or Comprehensive Action Plan). A Joint Task Force was created for this purpose. The importance of the area for the FARC was demonstrated by an increased presence of illicit crops, historical ties or roots, limited state presence, and a large and strong rear area for the FARC. In here, most of the biggest camps were located, as well as the main commanders. Plan Patriota forced the FARC to conduct a military retreat to uninhabited areas, which diminished FARC’s control in key territory. Additionally the death of key commanders and desertions amongst its ranks resulted in the dissolution of some of its Fronts.³⁵ The plan was successful to some extent. Throughout the

³³ Ludwig Von Bertalanffy, *General System Theory: Foundations, Development, Applications* (New York: George Brazillier, 1969), 9.

³⁴ Robert Axelrod and Michael D. Cohen, *Harnessing Complexity: Organizational Implications of a Scientific Frontier* (New York: The Free Press, 2000), 7.

³⁵ Ariel Alvarez Rubio, “Terrorismo y contraterrorismo en Colombia,” *Si Somos Americanos* 15, no. 1 (Jun 2015): 49-82, accessed October 6, 2015, <http://www.scielo.cl>

history of FARC, the army had been incapable to neutralize any top-level commanders. However, the group lost three of its principal commanders (members of the secretariat), a couple members of the General Central Staff and its principal political assets: a former presidential candidate (also French citizen) and three US citizens that were kept hostages, but it stalled.³⁶

On 2011, the Ministry of Defense ordered a comprehensive strategic review process of the forces' advances, performance, and achievements as a result of FARC's adaptation to the previous plan. The outcome was an innovative scheme that evolved into a new campaign plan, "Espada de Honor."³⁷ Plan Espada de Honor or Sword of Honor focuses on seven different areas of the country that coordinates with the FARC's Blocks. The objective is to conduct sustained military operations attacking the pivotal or articulating Fronts and the main supporting structures in these areas. However, each area is addressed in a different way since each one presents specific challenges from multiple viewpoints, meaning that a differential focus is the initial condition for approaching each one. For this purpose, a Joint-Coordinated-Interagency Task Force is created in every zone.³⁸ The Task Forces are supported by a whole-government approach. In addition, these

/scielo.php?pid=S0719-09482015000100003&script=sci_arttext.

³⁶ Colby Martin, "Colombia's New Counterinsurgency Plan," *Stratfor Global Intelligence*, March 26, 2012, accessed October 6, 2015, <https://www.stratfor.com/weekly/colombias-new-counterinsurgency-plan>. Before this plan was set in motion, the Army had not been able to capture or kill any member of the General Central Staff much less of the Secretariat throughout FARC's history (36 years).

³⁷ Colombian Ministry of National Defense, *Memorias al Congreso 2011 – 2012*, 2012, accessed October 6, 2015, <http://www.mindefensa.gov.co/irj/go/km/docs/Mindefensa/Documentos/descargas/Prensa/Documentos/memorias2011-2012.pdf>.

³⁸ Javier Andres Florez Henao, "La Doctrina Conjunta en Colombia: Analisis de la Fuerza de Tarea Conjunta Omega" (master's thesis, Universidad Nacional de Colombia, 2012), 17, accessed October 6, 2015, <http://www.bdigital.unal.edu.co/7724/1/699243.2012.pdf>. By Colombian doctrine, Coordinated refers to National Police units or assets placed in a military formation giving operational control over those to the service that commands the task force.

units are not tied by the concept of territorial jurisdiction meaning that they can move within a Division's AO in pursue of the structures being targeted.³⁹

The interdisciplinary group in charge of the strategic review, realized that the FARC could no longer be seen as an organization, but as a complex adaptive system, especially since every component have “different degrees of power, influence and capabilities, and operate at different speeds” while interacting, supporting, and affecting each other.⁴⁰ As a result, a new approach was taken and it produced a thorough picture of the terrorist group that allowed the Colombian Armed Forces to create differential operational approaches throughout the country, depending on different factors such as geography, enemy methods, types of enemy structures, finances, etc. The new approach resulted in a different way to see and analyze the FARC by each one of its subsystems and it was named the 6M (in Spanish), after a model developed by Toyota.⁴¹ FARC's subsystems are: Armed, Political, Command and Control, Support Networks, Finances, and Territorial Control.⁴² In turn, the 6M concept encompasses the latter but with a different label in order to facilitate its study: Command and Control (Mando y Control), Environment (Medio Ambiente – Space and Territory), Machinery (Maquinaria – Structures),

³⁹ Martin, “Colombia's New Counterinsurgency Plan.”

⁴⁰ Colonel Alberto Mejia, “Colombia's National Security Strategy, a New COIN Approach,” (master's thesis, U.S. Army War College, 2008), 7, accessed October 8, 2015, <http://www.dtic.mil/get-tr-doc/pdf?AD=ADA478460>.

⁴¹ Pablo Herrero, “Las 5M como metodo para localizar la causa raiz de un problema,” *Sage Blog*, March 05, 2011, accessed October 8, 2015, <http://blog.sage.es/innovacion-tecnologia/las-5-m-como-metodo-para-localizar-la-causa-raiz-de-un-problema/>. The 6M approach was adopted from a model developed by Toyota (5M), that was established to facilitate finding problems in each one of the company's systems that are involved in the overall manufacturing process. It is used to identify what is causing the failure on all the possible areas that are involved in the process. The sixth M added corresponds to command and control (mando y control).

⁴² Ejército Nacional de Colombia, *Guía de Planeamiento Estratégico 2012 – 2014*, 2012, accessed October 10, 2015, <http://cgfm.mil.co/documents/10197/306355/20.+GUÍA+PLANEAMIENTO+ESTRATÉGICO+EJÉRCITO+NACIONAL+2012+-+2014.pdf/3c7d5cf6-350c-4846-a543-513e0858f13a>.

Raw Materials (Materia Prima – Resources), Method (Método - Modality), and Workforce (Mano de Obra – Guerrillas and Militants).⁴³ In addition, this analysis allowed the military to understand which components were in the realm of armed actions and which belonged to political actions. Moreover, this visualization permitted to acknowledge components that worked in both realms in order to connect the armed and political organizations and complement the actions of each one in its perceived environment to achieve a more comprehensive effect.




Figure 2. FARC subsystems according to the 6M approach

Source: Data adapted from “Información de Comando FUTAP,” *Fuerza de Tarea Apolo*, May 2015, accessed February 18, 2016, <http://fliphtml5.com/dkwq/yrmi>.

The Command and Control subsystem is a paramount element not only to direct guerrilla operations throughout the country, but also to operationalize the FARC’s strategies. It

⁴³ “Conferencia con el Comité de Revisión Estratégica e innovación CRE-I,” *Escuela Superior de Guerra*, April 18, 2012, accessed October 11, 2015, <http://www.esdegue.mil.co/node/1615>.

encompasses the command structure, from the Secretariat and General Central Staff, all the way down to Blocks, Columns, Fronts, and Companies.

The Environment subsystem refers to the geographic and geopolitical context in which the FARC conducts its actions. Territoriality is paramount for the FARC since it allows the group to establish rear areas, mobility corridors and guarantees the continuous flow of sustainment. It is also in these areas where the accumulation of force is possible, thus allowing involvement in drug trafficking, illegal mining and influence over natives and peasants communities that served its political purposes. Since the correlation of actions has changed, the FARC has concentrated its efforts in strengthening the support structures, continuing the use of front man activities to legalize properties and especially, repopulation of areas with peasant and native communities brought from other parts of the country in order to extend the presence and influence.⁴⁴

The subsystem called Machinery refers to FARC's structures, both military and political. Although all the direction is given from the Secretariat, General Central Staff, and Blocks, the Fronts are the preponderant units. The fronts are the basic military structure with the capacity to produce military actions as well as terrorist activities, but also are the ones in charge of exerting influence over communities through intimidation, as well as gathering the necessary resources and sustainment by illegal activities. In this subsystem it is important to consider also the supporting structures that work to buttress the objectives, like the Colombian Clandestine Communist Party (PC3), the Bolivarian Movement for a New Colombia, the International Front (COMINTER), and social organizations (in the majority of cases, peasants).⁴⁵

⁴⁴ Fundación Ideas para la Paz, Situación Actual de las FARC: Un análisis de los cambios en las estrategias y territorialidad, September 1, 2011, accessed October 14, 2015, <http://www.ideaspaz.org/publications/posts/78>.

⁴⁵ Instituto de Estudios Políticos y Relaciones Internacionales, Nuestra Guerra sin Nombre. Transformaciones del Conflicto en Colombia, 191, 2006, accessed October 16, 2015, http://www.upf.edu/iuhjvv/_pdf/arrels/dossier/rodriguez/rodriguez1.pdf.

The fourth subsystem is Raw Materials. The main source of sustainment comes from drug trafficking. Although it allowed the group to grow in the 90s, it has had a negative impact due to a blurred perception of its political and ideological nature; also, it gave the perception of an organized crime enterprise. An additional factor is the lack of an accountable profit system, which in turn has created “rich” Front commanders that sometimes tended to put some of the organization’s money into their own pockets. Since drug trafficking has created stigmas for the FARC, it has also migrated towards the business of illegal mining while keeping extortion, especially toward international corporations.⁴⁶

The method is the framework used to achieve its objectives. Mao’s model of guerrilla warfare has been the most used in the world, however, it is not the only one used by the FARC.⁴⁷ As it was explained before, the FARC adapted three different theoretical frameworks to create its own. By applying the maxim of *all forms of struggle*, the FARC has also resorted to other modes of warfare, such as political warfare and judicial warfare, trying to affect the legitimacy of the state institutions as well as the military forces performance and its members.⁴⁸

The last subsystem is the Workforce. This component refers both to the members of the armed structures and the terrorism support networks. Even though the workforce is one of the most affected components of the whole system, its strength lies in the ability of the group to produce an ideological indoctrination that is backwards to the country’s own reality, keeping its

⁴⁶ Jeremy McDermott, “Criminal Activities of the FARC and Rebel Earnings,” *InSight Crime*, May 20, 2013, accessed October 17, 2015, <http://www.insightcrime.org/investigations/farc-criminal-activities-income?highlight=WjYmYXJjIiwZmFyYydzIiwJ2ZhcmMiLCInZmFyYyciXQ==>.

⁴⁷ Paul Robinson, *Dictionary of International Security* (Hoboken: Wiley Publishers, 2008), 90.

⁴⁸ Liliana Campos and Hermina Negrete, “Los Militares de Colombia de cara a la Justicia” (master’s thesis, Universidad Militar Nueva Granada, 2015), 6, accessed October 17, 2015, <http://repository.unimilitar.edu.co/handle/10654/12986>.

members in the dark as a way to resist the demoralization of the base guerrillas while avoiding any attempts to massive desertions.⁴⁹

Analyzing the FARC as a complex adaptive system is only the first step; the relevant part of addressing the problem is to understand how the different components interrelate with each other in order to create a comprehensive approach towards the attainment of the main objective. This interrelation and the low visibility towards it, is what has allowed the FARC to achieve some success in influencing the population as a way to infiltrate different social organizations throughout the country.




Figure 3. Internal concept of FARC as an organization

Source: Data adapted from “Información de Comando FUTAP,” *Fuerza de Tarea Apolo*, May 2015, accessed February 18, 2016, <http://fliphtml5.com/dkwq/yrmi>.

⁴⁹ Luis Villamarin, *En el Infierno* (Bogotá: Ediciones Luis Villamarin, 2003), 102.

It is not viable nor possible to attack only the military structures since the strength of FARC's organization resides in the ability to articulate the different structures both in the military aspect as well as in the political in a way that denotes crossed specialization within the group. This allows members of the armed structure to conduct political tasks at the same time and transforms them to key players, becoming more valuable from the targeting perspective. In addition, the diversity of tasks is also relevant in understanding the internal dynamics of the group, as well as its emergent properties.




Figure 4. FARC's as a system

Source: Data adapted from "Información de Comando FUTAP," *Fuerza de Tarea Apolo*, May 2015, accessed February 18, 2016, <http://fliphtml5.com/dkwq/yrmi>.

One thing that is clear since the beginning of the FARC, is its willingness to take over the government. Based on its acts and words, FARC is a "revolutionary organization that has a clear political intention in which substitution of the bourgeois State by the proletarian State is

impossible without a violent revolution.”⁵⁰ In order to achieve that substitution, FARC has to move constantly between the political and military realms, a fact that can be appreciated when FARC defined itself in a press release in July 12, 2003, as “the political-armed opposition of the governing regime.”⁵¹ As Paul Rossel states, “Clausewitz develops a powerful and comprehensive dialectic between war and politics, as moving logical interactions since the army is not an instrument of politics, but it is the most elevated way of politics.”⁵² The way FARC subsystems are interrelated between the armed and political aspects shows how intertwined both components are in the development of all its actions. Unity of both is essential and the synchronization achieved is a key to understand how the group attempts to take over the government. What is perceived is that those two are parallel lines that do not touch, while in reality they are totally fused in order to attain the main objective, take over the government through a revolutionary process.⁵³

Although the main theoretical framework is based on Mao’s theory, the FARC does not misestimate the imperative necessity of creating the required conditions for a general insurrection, especially due to the lack of being able to take over the government only by military action. As Acosta stated, “the masses organization is the conscious activity directed by our movement, based in our policies, toward the popular masses, their organizations, aimed to an insurrectional uprising and the power take over for the people.”⁵⁴ The group has been exploring

⁵⁰ Vicente Torrijos, *Crisis, Paz y Conflictos* (Bogotá: Editorial Universidad del Rosario, 2009), 174.

⁵¹ “Comunicado del Secretariado del Estado Mayor de las FARC (FARC-EP),” *La Haine*, July 12, 2003, accessed November 5, 2015, <http://www.lahaine.org/internacional/uribe.htm>.

⁵² Paul Rossel, “Carl Von Clausewitz y la teoría de la guerra,” *Eco. Revista de la Cultura de Occidente* 42, no. 253 (Nov. 1982): 71, accessed November 5, 2015, <http://opacudea.udea.edu.co/query.php?266719>.

⁵³ Torrijos, *Crisis, Paz y Conflictos*, 176.

⁵⁴ Camilo Andres Acosta Guete, “Análisis de los Procesos de Urbanización Político-

different initiatives, but relies mostly in the infiltration of already existing social movements as peasant and native organizations. The infiltration by the Bolivarian Movement for a New Colombia plays a paramount role, but the development of different plans and initiatives to support the former, are also in process: Plan of the masses 2011 – 2014, Work plan for a definitive independence 2010 – 2014, Rural and agrarian development for democratization and peace with social justice in Colombia.

The Bolivarian Movement for a New Colombia and Other Plans

A revolution is not a dinner party, or writing an essay, or painting a picture, or doing embroidery; it cannot be so refined, so leisurely and gentle, so temperate, kind, courteous, restrained and magnanimous. A revolution is an insurrection, an act of violence by which one class overthrows another.

—*Mao Tse Tung, Selected Works, Vol. I*

The FARC is a learning organization following Mao's theory. Since they are following Mao, they have developed an organization called the United Front. The importance is that the United Front allows a revolutionary organization to gain terrain by taking advantage of diverse groups' social vindications that are not necessarily the proletariat or the peasants. It is about identifying contradictions between social classes in order to create the links with those groups and translate them into a broad social movement that might be able to encompass all kinds of individuals.⁵⁵ With time, and by adapting to new circumstances, FARC has created more plans and initiatives to infiltrate social movements as the complement of the armed struggle.

Militares de las FARC-EP 2000-2010" (master's thesis, Universidad Colegio Mayor de Nuestra Señora del Rosario, 2013), 28, accessed November 14, 2015, <http://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/4893>.

⁵⁵ Acosta, "Análisis de los Procesos de Urbanización Político-Militares de las FARC," 34.

Bolivarian Movement for a New Colombia and the PC3

During the three years of tenure of the DMZ, FARC took the opportunity to launch its own political movement. It is a clandestine party by nature, in order to avoid what happened in the past with Unión Patriótica, that was destroyed, supposedly, by government forces, paramilitary forces, and drug cartels, but it is created as an alternative to traditional parties.⁵⁶ The DMZ provided a unique opportunity for FARC to create a large support zone from which launch attacks all over the country, increase the numbers of guerrillas and the capacity of its force towards the fulfillment of the strategic plan established in the seventh conference. It also allowed for the infiltration of social organizations, unions, and political work. As Mao stated, a support zone, or DMZ in this case, is an opportunity to organize and mobilize the masses, and train both the guerrilla units and the local defense forces in order to guarantee expansion in guerrilla warfare.⁵⁷ It is in this context that the group decided to launch its own political party as one of the ways to create the conditions for general insurrection, the PC3 and the Bolivarian Movement for a New Colombia (MBNC). Since its beginning, FARC has had ties with the PCC (Colombian Communist Party), but the latter wanted to impose its own agenda over the former, therefore they were never able to achieve complete synergy in the revolutionary process, so this moment was also an opportunity to sever this ties and have absolute political control.

The PC3 and the Bolivarian Movement for a New Colombia are launched together. The FARC has been defined as a political-military organization; therefore, the organization of the PC3 is the logical step to exercise its control over the politics and the changes that the military try to

⁵⁶ “Editorial: Renace la Unión Patriótica,” *El Tiempo*, July 11, 2013, accessed January 28, 2016, <http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/CMS-12924130>. Unión Patriótica or Patriotic Union was a political party founded by the FARC and Colombian Communist Party in 1985, as a condition of negotiations with the government at that time. The party suffered systematic violent attacks from different groups that led to its disappearance and eventual extermination.

⁵⁷ Torrijos, *Crisis, Paz y Conflictos*, 62.

impose.⁵⁸ The leadership of the party is the same than FARC's leadership and all its members are selected and approved by the group, countrywide, as well as regionally and locally. Its purpose is to create the revolutionary and insurrectional vanguard, following Lenin's model and principles maintaining the clandestinity as an organizational condition.⁵⁹ On the other hand, the Bolivarian Movement for a New Colombia is less restrictive and more inclusive. The Movement was launched as "the only power alternative different from the traditional political parties in search of structural changes and against those that have govern for many years without being able to solve the very serious political, economic, social, cultural, and environmental problems."⁶⁰ While the MBNC is broader than the PC3, it shares the ideological principles of the FARC but without having its constraining and disciplined structure and allowing anybody to join it, with an emphasis in recruiting, especially students and workers, as the vehicle to create conditions in urban areas. Its purpose is to develop masses organization processes in any social group subject to infiltration, as well as mobilization of those social groups and propaganda activities in order to achieve the second and definitive independence.⁶¹ Even though the leadership of the movement is directly tied to FARC, it requires the creation of a National Patriotic Council composed of one

⁵⁸ Carlos Medina Gallego and Francisco Toloza, *FARC-EP: Temas y Problemas Nacionales 1958 – 2008* (Bogotá: Universidad Nacional de Colombia, Facultad de Derecho, Ciencias Políticas y Sociales, 2009), 72.

⁵⁹ Carlos Medina Gallego, "FARC-EP: El Partido Comunista Clandestino (PCCC) y el Movimiento Bolivariano por la Nueva Colombia" (PhD diss., Universidad Nacional de Colombia, 2011), 10, accessed November 13, 2015, <http://www.scribd.com/doc/75319291/Las-FARC-EP-El-PCCC-y-El-Movimiento-Bolivariano#scribd>.

⁶⁰ "Discurso del Comandante Manuel Marulanda en el Acto de Lanzamiento del Movimiento Bolivariano," *Movimiento Bolivariano Suroccidente de Colombia*, April 29, 2000, accessed November 13, 2015, <http://www.mbsuroccidentededecolombia.org/documentos/discurso.html>.

⁶¹ Castaño, "Dos Estructuras Funcionales."

hundred citizens chosen by the group and in the regional and local levels. The citizens help form the Patriotic Councils and Open Regional Chapters.⁶²

The MBNC is thought as the platform that brings together different left-wing sectors that share the Bolivarianism and the Latinoamericanism ideas, but also struggle against Imperialism in order to build a country with social justice and fair democracy.⁶³ The Bolivarianism appeals to the principles and ideas that Simon Bolivar observed when fighting Spanish rule during the independence wars in order to create four effects: first, a call to nationalism using the name of the *Libertador* as the country's foundational figure, thus simplifying the ideology; second, as a way to reconcile it with the political project of the XXI Century Socialism (also named as Bolivarian Socialism), adopted by Venezuela at the end of the 90s; third, as the perfect approach to tie the left-wing currents in Latin America, once again, using the example and figure of Bolivar; and fourth, as the ability to maximize the feelings in the region against United States. At the end, the focus is local (Colombia) and continental (America) with the creation of the Continental Bolivarian Movement (MCB).⁶⁴

Plan for Independence 2010 – 2014 and Plan of the Masses 2011 – 2014

These plans were created in different timeframes but it is difficult to separate one from the other, so both would be treated as a single one. FARC's main ideologist, Alfonso Cano, created these plans. He was the first leader of the MBNC and after the death of Marulanda (founder and main FARC's leader), he was elected as the group's leader. The plan was designed

⁶² Juan Guillermo Ferro Medina, *El Orden de la Guerra: Las FARC-EP entre la Organización y la Política* (Bogotá: Editorial Universidad Javeriana, 2002), 149.

⁶³ Gallego, *FARC-EP: Temas y Problemas Nacionales*, 80.

⁶⁴ "Manifiesto del Movimiento Continental Bolivariano," Movimiento Continental Bolivariano, *Wordpress*, October 23, 2010, accessed November 14, 2015, <https://mcbol.wordpress.com>.

to be more preponderant towards politics and social movements than to military actions. The starting point is to engage with a former senator in order to create a new political party that would belong to the people while it establishes links with the MBNC. The document recommends participation in local and parliamentary elections while strengthening student and peasant organizations; build from the ground up new social sectors capable of being infiltrated (such as artists, web groups, etc.); but mostly, infiltrate social protests to test the ability to create insurrectional conditions.⁶⁵

The plan includes four stages by year: 2010 readiness, 2011 constitution and promotion, 2012 – 2013 projection, and 2014 consolidation. It is designed to encompass different aspects, as political organization, masses movements, communication, training, ideology and culture, international arena, and production. Each one of those areas is supportive of each other, but some of them are more relevant than the others. The political area is explored by constituting a party able to embrace all of the different left-wing currents with enough electoral strength, but also by participating through that party in different Latin American democratic processes ideologically compatible. The masses movements' area is addressed by the need to infiltrate peasant and native organizations and unions. The masses movement also engaged in reconstituting weak social organizations, especially in the popular bases. These includes the construction of new movements, bringing new social sectors is also encouraged and necessary for the project, such as Indian Reservations, Afro-American communities, women organizations, and artists.⁶⁶ The overall effort is aimed towards developing the insurrection of the masses. The international area

⁶⁵ Plinio Apuleyo Mendoza, "La Segunda Independencia," *El Tiempo*, September 13, 2013, accessed November 19, 2015, <http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/CMS-13060988?ts=51>.

⁶⁶ "Llamamiento a fortalecer la participación de la sociedad en los dialogos de paz," *Articulacion Continental de los Movimientos Sociales hacia el ALBA*, 2015, accessed November 19, 2015, <http://www.albamovimientos.org/2015/10/colombiallamamiento-a-fortalecer-la-participacion-de-la-sociedad-en-los-dialogos-de-paz/>.

is explored as the way to legitimate all the achievements by working with NGOs of judicial character in order to keep expanding the legal war against the military. Moreover, the international area serves to update any doctrinal and ideological constructs using Latin American political currents.⁶⁷

Proposals for Rural and Agrarian Development with Justice in Colombia

Since its beginnings, FARC stressed in its foundational charter the need to create an inclusive land reform as one of its revolutionary tenets.⁶⁸ Nowadays this requirement is included in the actual agenda for the peace dialogs, however, its reach is more than just the use of the land.

As part of the overall proposals to the government, the FARC is asking to create special jurisdiction areas in the country side, with similar benefits as the native or Indian Reservations. The proposed name is *Zonas de Reserva Campesina (ZRC)* or *Peasant Reservation Zones*. This area should be created by giving land to all the peasants that might need it as the way to guarantee their subsistence and as an alternative to end illegal crops, such as coca, marijuana, and poppy fields. The creation of peasant zones requires the state to furnish large state tenures from corporations or individuals in order to achieve a democratic use of the land. The ultimate goal is to give the ZRC special and complete autonomy over areas like political organization, social structure, economic development, management of resources, but above all, its own justice administration.⁶⁹ As far back as 2005, the FARC had been trying in different ways to create

⁶⁷ Guillermo Rodriguez Martinez, *La Trampa del Elefante* (Bogota: Editorial Oveja Negra, 2014), 207.

⁶⁸ Carlos A. Lozano Guillen, "Los 50 años de las FARC-EP: Historia que no puede ignorarse," *Semanario VOZ*, May 28, 2014, accessed November 22, 2015, <http://www.semanariovoz.com/2014/05/28/los-50-anos-de-las-farc-ep-historia-que-no-puede-ignorarse/>.

⁶⁹ "Desarrollo Rural y Agrario para la democratización y la paz con justicia social de Colombia. 100 Propuestas mínimas. Acuerdo parcial FARC-Gobierno," *FARC-EP*, 37-42, 2013, accessed November 22, 2015, <http://www.pazfarc-ep.org/pdf/100-PROPUESTAS-MINIMAS-1-PUNTO-AGRARIO.pdf>.

various ZRC. The group conducted a study of the richest geographical areas in term of natural resources and created front organizations with the sole purpose to push the proposal forward whilst developing an indoctrination process of the peasant communities in and around these locations.⁷⁰

In this sense, the FARC is asking nothing more but to create independent territories within the state, with a territorial extension of about one third of the lands available for agricultural activity in the country. Such territories would be susceptible to be controlled by the group. Through the zones control, the group would be able to gain positions in political organisms in the local, regional, and national level, thus achieving political and territorial control, therefore summing up more assets and easiness into creating more conditions for the masses insurrection towards the take over of the government.⁷¹

Marcha Patriótica

Although the FARC has launched two political movements, both of them are illegal and clandestine. In the past, the group explored an open approach with a legal political party called *Unión Patriótica* (UP), unfortunately, it did not go well, most of its members were assassinated and the party was disbanded. UP militants were not only FARC members; there were also militants from different left currents. After this episode, it was clear for the FARC that the experience could not be replicated, and if any attempt to have a political representation was going to be explored again, it could not be openly endorsed by the FARC.

⁷⁰ Ricardo Puentes Melo, “Zonas de Reserva Campesina: La siniestra realidad,” *Periodismo Sin Fronteras*, August 7, 2013, accessed November 24, 2015, <http://www.periodismo.sinfronteras.org/zonas-de-reserva-campesina-la-siniestra-realidad.html>.

⁷¹ Colombia Opina, “La Nueva Estrategia de Guerra de las FARC,” *Colombia Opina Blog*, June 17, 2013, accessed November 23, 2015, <https://colombiaopina.wordpress.com/2013/06/17/la-nueva-estrategia-de-guerra-de-las-farc/>.

In April 2012, a new political movement was created. Its name is *Marcha Patriótica* (MP), and its motto is to achieve “a second and definitive independence.”⁷² This political party is born as an option with a broad spectrum, capable and expected to bring together all the different left-wing currents together, as well as different disenfranchised social sectors such as students, workers, women, artists or cultural groups, unions, but also all kind of organizations or communities, especially the Afro-American communities and Indian Reservations. In fact, the PCC intertwined itself with this new political party.

The movement supports a negotiated end of the Colombian conflict, whilst claiming for a comprehensive agrarian reform. Moreover, it advocates the right for conflict’s victims to reparation and land restitution. *Marcha Patriótica* is also against any kind of megaprojects, especially in reference to mining and those developed by multinational corporations perceiving such projects as a form of imperialism. Although it supports the self-determination, it promotes the necessity of having close relationships with Latin American countries, with the further objective of achieving a full integration.⁷³

One of the operating concepts of the political party is allowing all kinds of social movements into it. It claims to have around 1,471 social and political organizations with a presence in twenty-eight departments (out of thirty two and a Special District).⁷⁴ Each organization has the right to have two representatives in the main directing body, known as the

⁷² Mauricio Jose Alvarez, “Por una segunda y definitiva independencia: un análisis al movimiento Colombiano *Marcha Patriótica*,” *Protestantismo Em Revista* 36, (2015): 104, accessed November 23, 2015, <http://periodicos.est.edu.br/index.php/nepp/article/view/2458>. This same motto has been used by the FARC several times in the past, especially while launching the Bolivarian Movement for a New Colombia in 2000, during the tenure of the DMZ.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, 101.

⁷⁴ Colombia is organized in departments instead of states.

National Patriotic Council, as well as the local and regional bodies, the regional Patriotic Councils.⁷⁵

After Operation Sodoma, in which Mono Jojoy was killed, his personal laptop was found.⁷⁶ Once intelligence units analyzed its content, his emails with FARC's main leadership were discovered. In these emails, they made a clear reference to the required support from a former Senator in order to bring the MBNC closer to a new political project, in an attempt to vindicate the former. In later operations that involved assaulting various FARC camps throughout the country, Marcha Patriótica propaganda was found, as well as instructions to link MBNC members to the Patriotic Councils of the MP. In some other documents, the Eastern Block authorizes to fund the people's movement in order to participate in a large-scale meeting in Bogota.⁷⁷

Notwithstanding the fact that MP's leaders have denied on different occasions to have ties with FARC, it is undeniable that at least an effort to infiltrate this particular movement is within FARC intentions. The myriad of organizations that comprised the MP is too good an opportunity for the FARC to let it go without taking advantage of it. FARC has been committed to the necessity to infiltrate and create social organizations in order to plant the seeds of the general insurrection and in this sense, MP is the perfect vessel to become the United Front that

⁷⁵ Camila Osorio, "Marcha Patriótica, la nueva izquierda que nace con un estigma," *La Silla Vacía*, April 19, 2012, accessed November 24, 2015, <http://lasillavacia.com/historia/marcha-patriotica-la-nueva-izquierda-que-nace-con-un-estigma-32748>.

⁷⁶ Luis Villamarín, *Complot Contra Colombia* (Bogotá: Ediciones Luis Villamarín, 2009), 45. Mono Jojoy was the third in command of the FARC, however, he was the military commander of the terrorist organization. Similar emails were found after Operation Fenix, in which Raul Reyes, the second in command was killed. He was also responsible for the FARC's international relationships as the commander of the COMINTER.

⁷⁷ Osorio, "Marcha Patriótica, la nueva izquierda que nace con un estigma."

FARC needs to close the loop in attaining this objective in its way to take over the government, especially since it is not possible anymore to do it from a solely military perspective.⁷⁸

Cauca Department and Its Strategic Importance

In the following sections, two case studies in which armed forces units confronting unarmed masses are presented, however, it is relevant to note that both cases occurred in the same department, Cauca, and in no other area of the country. This, by itself, creates the necessity to understand Cauca's importance for FARC.



Figure 5. Department of Cauca

Source: "Leave us in Peace: Security in Colombia's Cauca department," *Council on Hemispheric Affairs*, August 3, 2012, accessed December 3, 2015, <http://www.coha.org/leave-us-in-peace-security-in-colombias-cauca-department/>.

⁷⁸ Acosta, "Análisis de los Procesos de Urbanización Político-Militares de las FARC," 35.

Cauca is located in the southwestern part of Colombia, 80% of its territory is comprised of mountain ranges, making it a natural fortress. Some of the most important rivers in the country originate in this area, and it presents different terrain configurations such as rich valleys and jungles. From this area, it is possible to approach the country's three Andean mountain ranges. The climate is favorable for illicit drugs cultivation and the access to the Pacific Ocean gives the ability of sending drugs and receiving weapons from abroad. The Pan-American Highway, that facilitates trade with Ecuador, also crosses through Cauca.⁷⁹ From the department it is possible to communicate with important areas to the east, north, and south and using its rivers, the first and third most important ports in country are within reach.⁸⁰ Access to critical, rear, and historical areas for FARC are located within the department borders, like the *Strategic Deployment Center* that FARC established in its seventh conference, as well as Caquetá, Putumayo, Meta, Guaviare which relates to rear areas used in the past.⁸¹

⁷⁹ It was conceived as a highway to facilitate ground transportation from Argentina and Chile, all the way up north to Alaska. Currently, it is cut between Colombia and Panama.

⁸⁰ "Algunos Indicadores sobre la Situación de los Derechos Humanos en Cauca," *Agencia de la ONU para los refugiados*, last modified July 2005, accessed December 4, 2015, http://www.acnur.org/t3/uploads/media/COI_1256.pdf?view=1.

⁸¹ "Colombia: an overview of the FARC's military structure," *European Strategic Intelligence and Security Center*, December 1, 2010, accessed October 6, 2015, <http://www.esisc.org/publications/briefings/colombia-an-overview-of-the-farcs-military-structure>. The *Strategic Deployment Center* comprised an area located in the Eastern mountain range that surrounded Bogotá. FARC's objective was to locate more than 20 fronts here in order to attack and seize the capital, then launch the general insurrection in a support effort to take over the government.




Figure 6. FARC's territorial presence 2002 – 2008

Source: "The FARC, Territorial Presence," *Crisis Group Latin America*, March 2009, accessed December 4, 2015, http://www.crisisgroup.be/flash/farc_mar09/farc.html.

There is an additional element that makes Cauca so appealing, it is the department with the biggest number of Indian reservations. In Colombia, the percentage of native population is around 3% of the overall population, however, their land tenure is 30% of the country. Cauca holds 21% of the total native population.⁸² It is important to remember as well that Indian reservations have a special legislation that gives them a broad spectrum of autonomy.

FARC's interest in Cauca is based on a myriad of circumstances. First, the necessity to protect strategic corridors established to gain access to the sea in order to facilitate sending drugs to Central America in conjunction with the Mexican cartels and to receive weapons and explosives to strengthen its fronts. Due to the effectiveness of the military campaign in the main

⁸² Fabio Alberto Ruiz Garcia, "La Construcción de la Territorialidad para los Grupos Étnicos en Colombia," *Revista de la Información Básica* 1, no. 2 (Dec 2006), accessed December 4, 2015, https://www.dane.gov.co/revista_ib/html_r2/articulo7_r2.htm.

rear area, FARC has been moving coca and poppy fields to Cauca and Nariño. Indian reservation areas cannot be sprayed.⁸³ The second circumstance is that Cauca has a strong presence of organized criminal bands (BACRIM) dedicated, mostly, to drug trafficking and extortion. In order to work in this area, FARC has to establish an alliance with these bands and that serves a twofold purpose. It is necessary to operate in this region and that would guarantee shared profits, otherwise it would have signified war between the two groups, but it also supports FARC's intelligence efforts through the BACRIM's networks.⁸⁴ The third circumstance is due to the richness of the area since because by getting involved in illegal mining, especially gold, the group benefits of an activity which profits are not insignificant. There are megaprojects being created in Cauca. More than 130 transnational enterprises have settled in the department lately, which gives FARC a source for revenue from extortion, as well as the establishment of a free port.⁸⁵ Fourth, along with Huila and Tolima, it is a region tied to the beginnings of the FARC that allows communication between the three areas but also connects Caquetá, Putumayo and Meta, which is important for the group in its intention to reconstitute all the losses suffered by the government, especially to one of its legacy major units, the Joint Central Command.⁸⁶ In the triangle formed by Cauca, Huila, and Tolima is where the main historical and ideological FARC constituents are

⁸³ "La arremetida de las FARC en Cauca," *Revista Semana*, December 09, 2014, accessed December 4, 2015, <http://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/la-arremetida-de-las-farc-en-cauca/411677-3>.

⁸⁴ Maria del Rosario Arrázola, "Lo que esconde la estrategia de las FARC," *El Espectador*, February 4, 2012, accessed December 7, 2015, <http://www.elespectador.com/noticias/judicial/esconde-estrategia-de-farc-articulo-324737>.

⁸⁵ Fernanda Espinosa Moreno, "Indigenas vs. Ejercito y las FARC: algunas razones detrás del conflicto en el Cauca," *Otra América*, July 20, 2012, accessed December 04, 2015, <http://otramerica.com/temas/indigenas-vs-ejercito-y-las-farc-algunas-razones-detras-del-conflicto-en-el-cauca/2187>.

⁸⁶ Jorge Mantilla, "La Apuesta Geopolítica de las FARC en el Cauca, Concentración o Dispersión?," *Razón Pública*, July 23, 2012, accessed December 04, 2015, <http://www.razonpublica.com/index.php/regiones-temas-31/3119-la-apuesta-geopolitica-de-las-farc-en-el-cauca-icongracion-o-dispersion.html>.

located, thus facilitating recruitment and militia efforts. It is in these areas that the group was born and its initial identity was forged. Although it is true that the colonist peasants were the supporters of the FARC in its beginnings and most likely are the targeted group for social infiltration, the value added of the Indian reservations is equal to no other. Lately, FARC has been recruiting Indians in the area, as a way to increase its numbers, but also to further infiltrate and gain traction in Indian reservations.⁸⁷

Direct and indirect manipulation of natives by pressure or infiltration is in the best interest of FARC. On one hand, there are benefits that are granted to them by the law, especially in terms of using their own judicial system. On the other hand, their land tenure is so extensive that it would allow for the consolidation of the project of the ZRC in a much easier way, thus facilitating the road to the general insurrection and government take over.

Case Study: Army Platoon on a Communications Relay Outpost

One of the critical areas that the Army wanted to affect in the Espada de Honor Campaign Plan was the Cauca department. To attack the most belligerent FARC structures in Cauca, the Sixth Front and the Jacobo Arenas Column, the government created Task Force Apollo. The purpose of the Task Force is to assume the control of military operations in the area, with a mixed approach of gaining territorial control while focusing in attacking the previous structures, since both were recognized as pivotal structures.⁸⁸ One of the battalions involved in territorial control was the High Mountain Battalion No. 8, with the task of providing control and over watch over mobility corridors. According with this approach, in a predominant hill named

⁸⁷ Salud Hernandez Mora, "Cauca, la guerra inacabable," *El Mundo*, May 29, 2011, accessed December 04, 2015, <http://www.elmundo.es/america/2011/05/27/colombia/1306511810.html>.

⁸⁸ Fuerza de Tarea Apolo, *Información de Comando FUTAP*, May 2015, accessed December 18, 2015, <http://fliphtml5.com/dkwq/yrmi>.

“Berlin”, a platoon (around 45 soldiers) was located in a fixed outpost that served as a retransmission node for the Task Force as well as having private mobile phone antennas to give coverage to small towns around, especially Toribio which can be seen from the hilltop.

On July 16, 2012, Cauca’s Indian Governor launched an ultimatum to the Army, asking the Army to cease all military presence in eight different counties, which represents a fifth of the department, and established midnight of the same day as the deadline for compliance of his demands. The units assigned to the Task Force did not fulfill the demands. There is a constitutional duty by which the army has to provide security for all inhabitants and throughout all the territory.⁸⁹ The following morning, the Indians living around Toribio decide to occupy Berlin’s hilltop, justifying this action claiming the mountain as sacred territory. The numbers are not clear, but a mass between 1,000 and 4,000 Indians gathered and initiated the march towards Berlin. Once the mass got there and the outpost was surrounded, the Indian Governor of Toribio’s council read a message stating that they were ready to enter the military base to start taking all the elements belonging to the soldiers outside the perimeter. A group of soldiers, located in what could be called the gate of the base, faced the Indians but they did not move. The orders given to the Sergeant in command of the unit, directly by the General officer commanding the Task Force, were not to confront the Indians, not to respond to any aggression, much less shooting at them, unless shot at first, but by any circumstance not to abandon the hilltop.⁹⁰

At this point, the Indians armed mainly with sticks, canes, and some of them with machetes, entered the base, and started to move outside the food and mattresses of the soldiers.

⁸⁹ Denunciando, “Política y Sociedad: Ultimatum para que las FF.MM. se retiren del territorio indígena vence hoy,” *Denunciando Blog*, July 17, 2012, accessed December 15, 2015, <http://www.denunciando.com/politica-y-sociedad-85/689059-ultimatum-para-que-las-ff-mm-se-retiren-de-territorio-indigena-vence-hoy.html>.

⁹⁰ Colprensa, “La dignidad del Ejército fue burlada por indígenas,” *Vanguardia Liberal*, July 18, 2012, accessed December 15, 2015, <http://www.vanguardia.com/actualidad/colombia/165931-la-dignidad-del-ejercito-fue-burlada-por-indigenas>.

Some of the food was even burned on site, while some of it was stolen. Damage to the trenches and the bunkers around the base was also caused by the mass of people. After this action, the Indians requested the soldiers to leave the hilltop and the Sergeant and the soldier's response was that the only way to leave the base was to be carried outside of it, which the Indians did. By groups, the Indians grabbed the soldiers and took them outside the base and down the hill ten to twenty meters as a symbolic way to tell them they had to leave.⁹¹ There were some versions affirming that even at the same time, shots were fired from surrounding hills by the FARC and that approximately, ten explosions were heard in the vicinity of the base.⁹²

The worst part of this event was when the Indians tried to carry the NCO in command out of the base. A numerous group surrounded him and a couple of soldiers came to protect him to avoid any injuries. However, the group threatened the soldiers and a tragedy almost occurred. With tears in his eyes, the Sergeant ordered the soldiers to stand down and allowed the protesters to carried and throw him outside of the base.

The President condemned this action and warned the Indians of legal actions against them for attacking the military force. The people from Toribio and towns around were precise to state publicly that they did not have any responsibility for that action and on the contrary, that they wanted and needed the Army's presence to protect them from any FARC attack. Some other inhabitants rejected the Indian demands to the Army and even asked them to understand the necessity of having the Army around. Otherwise, it would be an open region not only for the FARC but also for criminal bands and drug cartels. The Minister of Defense affirmed that the

⁹¹ Luis Angel Murcia, "Cauca: un día de furia y vergüenza en Berlín, el cerro de Toribío," *Revista Semana*, July 18, 2012, accessed December 15, 2015, <http://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/cauca-un-dia-furia-vergenza-berlin-cerro-toribio/261383-3>.

⁹² Juanita León, "Los indígenas del Cauca: el dilema más difícil para el Gobierno," *La Silla Vacía*, July 17, 2012, accessed December 15, 2015, <http://lasillavacia.com/historia/los-indigenas-del-cauca-el-dilema-mas-dificil-para-el-gobierno-34734>.

Army would not abandon the area and that the protection of the people would continue. He also reminded that the same population of those villages were the ones that have declared that the Indian organizations and demonstrations had been infiltrated by the guerrilla countless times.⁹³

The representative of the Multicultural Indian Peoples Organization (OPIC), stated that there is a signed agreement between some Indian authorities and governors with FARC in order to strengthen the Indian process. The agreement is to force the armed forces to leave the areas in Cauca as a reinforcement of the Indian authority and autonomy.⁹⁴ The agreement was signed in 2005 by ex-governors and second and third in command of the FARC. To the actual governor, FARC gave him the order to force the armed forces out of the department.⁹⁵

During a visit to Cauca's capital city, Popayan, the following day, the President announced the content of an email found in a computer captured during an operation in May 2012, which belonged to the commander of the FARC's Western Joint Command. The email stated that propaganda was delivered by the guerrilla in the northern Cauca instructing the population to demand the Army to cease operations and to leave the area. Also, the President affirmed having proof of the direct links between Indians and the FARC. Even going further, he announced judicial operations in the following days to capture members of FARC's supporting networks and that some of them were members of Indian communities.⁹⁶

⁹³ EFE, "Indígenas expulsan a 100 soldados de base militar del Cauca," *El Espectador*, July 17, 2012, accessed December 15, 2015, <http://www.elspectador.com/noticias/judicial/indigenas-expulsan-100-soldados-de-base-militar-del-cau-articulo-360673>.

⁹⁴ "Indígenas de Cauca niegan vínculos con las FARC," *Revista Semana*, July 17, 2012, accessed December 15, 2015, <http://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/indigenas-cauca-niegan-vinculos-farc/261343-3>.

⁹⁵ Jaime Andrés Ospina, "La OPIC denuncia que indígenas del Cauca tienen vínculos con las FARC," *W Radio*, July 19, 2012, accessed December 15, 2015, <http://www.wradio.com.co/noticias/actualidad/la-opic-denuncia-que-indigenas-del-cauca-tienen-vinculos-con-las-farc/20120719/nota/1725160.aspx>.

⁹⁶ "Santos reveló que alias Pacho Chino habría influenciado a la población del Cauca para

On July 19, a riot control detachment of the National Police showed up on Berlín hill and after a brief engagement with a mass of 150 Indians, the National Police (PNC) seized control of the military base. The last week of September, FARC's Sixth Front attacked the Berlin base for approximately 20 hours, without being able to cause any significant harm on the unit posted in that base.⁹⁷

Case Study: National Police and El Mango Village

El Mango village is part of Argelia municipality in Cauca. Even though is a small town, its importance resides in diverse factors. This village is located near the border with Nariño department and in the middle of the mobility corridor that runs through the mountains of the western mountains range from the ports located in the south in the Pacific Ocean to the northern areas of Cauca where illicit crops are being cultivated. The general area is the canyon formed by the Micay River, which is very fertile, from the agricultural point of view. The mobility corridor allows FARC and BACRIM to move drugs out of the country and smuggle money and weapons into Cauca. The terrain and the weather are also propitious for cultivation of illegal crops.⁹⁸ El Mango has around 2,000 inhabitants.

On June 23, 2015, Argelia's Major denounced that FARC's Sixth and Sixtieth Fronts were exerting pressure on El Mango's population to force them to expel the National Police unit located in the village. That National Police unit was organized from Carabineros, a special rural

sacar a las FFMM," *W Radio*, July 18, 2012, accessed December 15, 2015, <http://www.wradio.com.co/noticias/actualidad/santos-revelo-que-alias-pacho-chino-habria-influenciado-a-la-poblacion-del-cauca-para-sacar-a-las-ffmm/20120718/nota/1724967.aspx>.

⁹⁷ "Farc tratan de tomarse otra vez el cerro Berlín en el Cauca," *Radio Santa Fe*, September 27, 2012, accessed December 15, 2015, <http://www.radiosantafe.com/2012/09/27/farc-tratan-de-tomarse-otra-vez-el-cerro-berlin-en-el-cauca/>.

⁹⁸ Jorge Enrique Rojas, "El corregimiento del El Mango, en el Cauca, es un pueblo poseído por la guerra," *El País*, July 14, 2013, accessed January 15, 2016, <http://www.elpais.com.co/elpais/judicial/noticias/mango-cauca-pueblo-poseido-por-guerra>.

police branch with more training and better equipped than regular police units, they even had rifles as their individual weapon. This unit in particular was comprised of approximately sixty men. After all the events, one of the policemen said that he had been hearing rumors of FARC's pressure on the villagers to force the police out of the town for fifteen days before everything happened. In addition, they heard that the deadline established by the FARC to the population was the same day that the events took place.⁹⁹

On the morning of June 23, people from all over the village and rural areas came together to become a mass of 500 to 1,000 people and they conducted a riot in the village, asking the National Police unit located there to leave town. The people started a demonstration near the Police station, but as the animosity towards PNC grew, they came closer to the facilities. The people surrounded the Police station and the house beside it (that served as kitchen-dining facility and quarters) and asked the policemen to leave in order to avoid a FARC attack on the village. Although being surrounded, the PNC did not comply with the demands. Amongst the people, it was possible to see Indians, locals, and unknown persons, although some had covered their heads with masks. At this point, the mob was not only yelling at the PNC unit, but they also were throwing stones and bolas at the facilities. The riot escalated and the people entered the house and took the belongings of the policemen out to the street. At that point, they tried to bring out the policemen, and a small fight occurred. Although the policemen were armed with rifles, they only fought back throwing stones at the mob and with their bare hands. The people entered the premises and started to attack the policemen with sticks and machetes. Additionally, the people took them out of the station and the Police incurred fifteen casualties.¹⁰⁰ After the people expelled

⁹⁹ "FARC amenazaron a habitantes de El Mango para que desalojaran a los policas," *El Espectador*, June 23, 2015, accessed January 15, 2016, <http://www.elspectador.com/noticias/nacional/farc-amenazaron-habitantes-de-el-mango-desalojaran-los-articulo-568123>.

¹⁰⁰ "Asonada en El Mango (Cauca): campesinos destruyen estación de Policía," *La FM*,

the PNC from the house beside the station, the place was set on fire. The policemen gathered outside the station towards one of the town exits and from there they saw how the rest of the facilities were destroyed. A group of inhabitants, brought a backhoe and started to take down the barricade in front of the police station (built there years ago), as well as the trenches and the housing, pretty much everything that was built with sandbags and the roofs that were constructed with zinc shingles.¹⁰¹

While all this was happening, the policemen, with the intention of avoiding a major confrontation with the civilians, loaded their trucks with all their belongings and decided to drive from El Mango all the way to the town of Argelia (which is the municipality biggest city and the administrative center), escorted by members of the community. The Indians held two policemen hostage. Behind the police trucks, a delegation from El Mango drove to the municipality to deliver the policemen to one of the branches of the public ministry present in the city.¹⁰² The Defensoria del Pueblo (in charge of overseeing the human rights of the population) received the policemen with their weapons and material from the Indians and community delegation.¹⁰³

In their defense, the people from El Mango stated that an attack from the Sixtieth FARC's Front was imminent and that circumstance only left them with one viable option, forcing

June 23, 2015, accessed January 15, 2016, <http://www.lafm.com.co/orden-público/noticias/asonada-en-el-mango-cauca-camp-185214>.

¹⁰¹ "El municipio que la Policía tuvo que abandonar," *Revista Semana*, June 23, 2015, accessed December 16, 2015, <http://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/habitantes-de-zona-rural-de-colombia-obligan-desalojo-de-policias/432342-3>.

¹⁰² Rex A. Hudson, *Colombia: A Country Study* (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, Federal Research Division, 2010), 239. The Public Ministry has four branches: Procuraduría ensures that the government officials fulfill their duties without abusing their authority; Contraloría exercises fiscal oversight and auditing; Defensoria del Pueblo supervises the respect for human rights; and Personería that does all three of them at the municipal level.

¹⁰³ "Defensoria pide medidas urgentes tras asonada en El Mango (Cauca)," *La FM*, June 23, 2015, accessed December 15, 2015, <http://www.lafm.com.co/orden-público/noticias/defensor%C3%ADa-pide-medidas-urgent-185252>.

the PNC out of the village or if not, they would suffer the consequences. The PNC and the Army went even further, and decided to run some intelligence actions. In doing so, they discovered that the riot was co-opted by the FARC by exerting pressure on the population, and by infiltrating the demonstration with the purpose of destroying the premises.¹⁰⁴ A couple of hours after the PNC unit reached Argelia, the Defensor del Pueblo rejected publicly the actions of the population, labeled them as civil disobedience, and asked the government to take whatever action deemed necessary in order to guarantee the presence of the state in the zone as well as the protection of the population from any attack by the FARC or BACRIM. He also reinforced his position by sending letters to the Minister of Defense and the National Police Director with the request. In addition, he referred to the episode as a paradox, since most of the municipalities in the country were screaming for getting more police and this little town was the only one trying to get rid of it.¹⁰⁵

That same day, the President ordered the Minister of Defense and the PNC Director to send as many army platoons and PNC units as necessary in order to retake control of the area around the Micay's river canyon and El Mango village. His words emphasized the principle that it cannot exist a single part of the country's territory vetoed for the armed forces.¹⁰⁶ The following day, the PNC Director initiated the process to return units to El Mango. In this opportunity, around 300 policemen were sent to the Village and tight coordination with the Army

¹⁰⁴ "Defensoria pide medidas urgentes por desalojo de policías en El Mango, Cauca," *El Espectador*, June 23, 2015, accessed December 16, 2015, <http://www.elespectador.com/noticias/nacional/defensoria-pide-medidas-urgentes-desalojo-de-policias-e-articulo-568067>.

¹⁰⁵ Colprensa, "Rechazan ataque de la población civil a policías de El Mango, Cauca," *El País*, June 24, 2015, accessed January 15, 2016, <http://www.elpais.com.co/elpais/judicial/noticias/rechazan-ataque-poblacion-civil-policias-mango-cauca>.

¹⁰⁶ Colprensa, "Defensoría busca garantizar permanencia de policías en El Mango, Cauca," *El País*, June 26, 2015, accessed January 15, 2016, http://www.elpais.com.co/elpais/judicial/noticias/defensoria-pueblo-adelantara-reunion-con-autoridades-mango-cauca#cxrecs_s.

was established in order to protect the people from any outside threat that may be coming their way, including sending two platoons to exercise territorial control on the areas surrounding the village.¹⁰⁷

War of the Masses on Development

After reviewing the two case studies, it is clear that despite all government efforts, the FARC has been able to infiltrate social movements, either by pressure or by ideological affinity. Even though is not addressed in this study, the amount of social movements infiltrated is greater than only Indian reservations. The previous examples are only the tip of the iceberg. Although it could be seen as a bold assumption, it is a valid assumption since the Indians are a hardcore, traditionalist-closed system, and one of the most difficult groups to influence. That is the reason why the focus was on the Cauca department, the department with most Indian reservations. There are additional case studies to demonstrate the infiltration of different groups but that would require a much larger study.

It is possible to affirm that the two case studies presented were only the test bed in order to see the government's response under similar situations from the FARC's perspective. In this regard, it is worrisome that both cases were marked by almost complete impunity, sending out the message that situations like this could be replicated without major implications, thus opening the door to insurrectional efforts through the infiltration of social movements.

The working plan for a definitive independence along with the MBNC and the PC3, are redundant efforts pointing in the same direction, the infiltration of social movements by the FARC in order to bring them together as part of Marcha Patriótica. Marcha Patriótica was

¹⁰⁷ "El retorno de las fuerza publica a Argelia," *Revista Semana*, June 25, 2015, accessed December 17, 2015, <http://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/fuerza-publica-regresa-argelia/432541-3>.

established as a political alternative to disenfranchised groups or social movements. In this case, a symbiotic relationship between both sets of initiatives is created. The fusion obtained here is a crystal clear attempt to materialize the idea of the United Front as the vessel to be used for a war of the masses by taking advantage of social organizations' vindications.

FARC's stubbornness pursuing the creation of ZRC with complete autonomy is another example on how to establish base conditions for a further war of the masses. FARC's popular support is not large. Thus, the creation of the ZRC's provides the second best opportunity for creating conditions through regional indoctrination and local governance in order to challenge and contest the state's control of territory thus facilitating the seizure of power.

Even though the FARC adopted three theories to create its own theory of action, in this precise moment, the preponderancy lies with Lenin's Insurrectional Model. With the application of the military-based theories of Protracted War from Mao Tse-Tung and Vo Nguyen Giap, the FARC was not able to achieve the desired end state or the ultimate goal, seizure of power. However, following the teachings of Lenin's Insurrectional model, the infiltration of social movements, the peace process, and the constitution of a political party, are the vessels to support an insurrectional effort. It is important to remember that a supporting effort to achieve the previous effect is the observance and the spread of the Bolivarianism, with the purpose to force any intervention or support from any country that does not belong to Latin America to cease.

War of the masses creates big operational and tactical challenges for the army. On the operational realm, the army needs to address the challenge that arises from having to deal with clandestine unarmed organizations that operate as separated cells and as complex adaptive systems. Moreover, the Army would have to perform within an environment that is restrictive for intelligence operations and sensitive to scrutiny of what might be considered as a violation of fundamental rights. From the tactical perspective, in the current conditions, the army does not

have the necessary tools to fight in such environment. The environment's conditions have to change by creating new laws if the army is to emerge successful in this kind of confrontation.

Conclusions

Popular support plays a paramount role in any insurgent movement. As Kalyvas states, "popular support is the best reflection to consent of authority for either the incumbent government or the insurgent."¹⁰⁸ Since the FARC has a very limited popular support due to the methods employed to conduct war, the group has been clever enough to articulate a political effort supporting the military one.¹⁰⁹ In this regard, the possibilities brought, from the political perspective, by the plans mentioned in this study that allow the articulation and infiltration of social movements are increasingly dangerous, especially since FARC's military effort became futile. By infiltrating a broad array of movements, the FARC is able to capitalize any social contradictions existing in the society and reflected in these groups, thus creating conditions to generate social protest in an attempt to create synergy for its own political movement once the peace process is finished. It is important for the government to remember the causes, the roots of the problem: lack of personal security due to the state's absence from large swaths of the national territory.¹¹⁰ If the FARC signs the peace agreement, it would mean nothing if the root causes of the conflict are not addressed by the government.

¹⁰⁸ Major Jon-Paul N. Maddaloni, "An Analysis of the FARC in Colombia: Breaking the Frame of FM 3-24" (master's thesis, School of Advanced Military Studies, 2009), 32, accessed February 2, 2016, <http://www.cgsc.edu/sams/media/Monographs/MaddaloniJ-21MAY09.pdf>.

¹⁰⁹ Brigadier General Ariel Alvarez Rubio, "Guerra insurgente, negociación de conflicto y memoria histórica en Colombia," *Revista Política y Estrategia*, no. 125 (Jan 2015): 57-82, accessed February 1, 2016, <http://www.anepe.cl/wp-content/uploads/ANEPE-Nº-125-COMPLETA1.pdf>.

¹¹⁰ Thomas A. Marks, "A Model Counterinsurgency: Uribe's Colombia (2002-2006) vs. FARC," *Military Review* 87, no. 2 (April/March 2007): 41-56, accessed January 24, 2016, <http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/p124201coll1/id/160>.

FARC has also incorporated Bolivarianism as the way to gain support in the international arena, specifically around Latin America. It is an effort to renew and reconcile the socialist ideology by embracing the ideas of Venezuela's XXI Century Socialism by appealing to the figure of Simón Bolívar. It is also an attempt to create a common consciousness to neglect the support and participation of international liberal democracies into resolving Colombia's problems.

FARC understood that it is incapable of seizing power through a military option, and by being an adaptable organization it resorted to Lenin's teachings, "the combination of all forms of struggle" as the way forward. In this case, this was accomplished by strengthening the masses organization component with the objective of developing a war of the masses.

At this point in the peace process, is undeniable that the FARC is going to build its own political party and the conditions created by the group are going to boost FARC's possibilities to alter the political landscape in the future. The masses organization component within the FARC's system is a well-constructed, robust, clandestine component and has been efficient in fulfilling its objective, the infiltration of all kinds of social movements. The infiltration has been possible not only in rural environments but in urban movements as well.

From the government forces perspective, war of the masses is worse than guerilla warfare. Any miscalculation in the scale of the response against any action of this kind would have critical consequences for the legitimacy of the government forces. On the contrary, from the insurgency perspective, it is more successful since it is more difficult for the government to counter, requires much less military effort, is not a financial burden, and provides less visibly thus becoming more complex to be attacked.

Recommendations

In this stage of the process, the UN has agreed to oversee the agreements and it is important that the areas to concentrate the FARC for verification do not coincide with the

requested areas by the FARC to create ZRC. This will just facilitate any attempts to expand the social infiltration efforts.

Changes in the Colombian Judicial Code are required to avoid impunity if any action, similar to those described in the case studies, is taken again against government forces. Credible coercion is fundamental to keep from any other attempts to replicate situations alike.

A review of the normativity established for Indian reservations must be conducted in regards of being covered, like everybody else, by the Colombian law, establishing harmony amongst both bodies of rules. This also applies to the normativity and the reach of the ZRCs.

The government needs to address people's grievances; especially of peasant organizations since the rural base might be used first to expand any insurrectional attempts through social protest.

Government forces need to conduct a further systemic analysis of the FARC's masses organization sub-system or component. It is imperative to understand how the ties between the group and social movements are created and how to counter those associations with enough anticipation to disrupt any attempt of insurrectional efforts that might support the political action of already existing political parties, or of any political party created by the FARC once the peace process comes to an end. Finally, the Colombian Army has to modify the Rules Of Engagement – Rules for the Use of Force to address this kind of scenarios when the situation presents itself again.

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